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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROGER A. BLOMQUIST,

:

Case No. 940369-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) in a drug free zone, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
and 58-37-8(5) (a) (1994); possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) in a drug free zone, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) and 58-37-8(5) (a)
(1994).

I
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the warrant authorizing the search of

defendant's residence supported by probable cause?
A magistrate's probable cause determination is given
great deference on review.
(1983).

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236

The affidavit supporting a search warrant application

must, however, provide a "'substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause.'"

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 915 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). The
"substantial basis" requirement entails limited review of the
magistrate's determination, asking only whether the affidavit
contains sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate
could have found probable cause.
2.

See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.

Assuming the search warrant affidavit was for some

reason technically deficient, did the trial court properly admit
the evidence seized from defendant's residence on the basis that
the officers who conducted the search acted in good faith?
This Court reviews de novo the question of whether an
officer acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant.

State

v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993).
3.

Was the stop, detainment and search of codefendant

proper?
These issues pertain only to codefendant.

Defendant's

appeal has not been consolidated with codefendant's appeal.
State v. Edenfield, Court of Appeals No. 940368-CA.

See

Therefore,

these issues do not present an issue for review in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with three controlled substance
violations, alleged to have occurred in a drug free zone, under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(5)(a) (1994):
possession of cocaine, a second degree felony; possession of
marijuana, a third degree felony; and possession of xanax, a
class A misdemeanor.

Additionally, defendant was charged with

possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5(l) and
58-37-8(5) (a) (1994) (R. 2-1).x
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrant-supported search of his home, alleging that the
evidence was seized in violation of his federal and state
constitutional rights.2

Following a hearing on the matter, the

trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 51-45).
Thereafter, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas
to possession of cocaine and marijuana in a drug free zone,
second and third degree felonies (R. 85-84) .
misdemeanor counts were dismissed.

Id.

The remaining

The trial court

sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of one to 15 years
for the second degree felony and to an indeterminate term of not
more than 5 years for the third degree felony (R. 89, 114). The

1

The record is numbered in reverse chronological order.

2

The motion to suppress and supporting memorandum are
located in the companion record of State v. Edenfield, Case No.
940368-CA at R. 20-17, 36-24.
3

court then suspended execution of the prison terms and placed
defendant on a 36 month probationary term.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Search Warrant Affidavit

The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant
affidavit (R. 12-8, a copy is attached as Addendum A).

The

affidavit was submitted by Sergeant Mike Blackhurst of the
Pleasant Grove Police Department, an experienced narcotics
investigator (R. 12-11) (copies of the search warrant, affidavit
and return are attached as Addendum A), and had been reviewed by
a county attorney (R. 14), see Addendum A.
Sergeant Blackhurst sought a warrant to search
defendant's home, his person and the person of defendant's
girlfriend, codefendant Linda Edenfield and codefendant's
Corvette for "controlled substances, paraphernalia, . . . buy/owe
sheets, scales, and all other contraband associated with
controlled substances" (R. 13), see Addendum A.
The affidavit in support of the search warrant set
forth information gleaned over an approximate eight month period,
from September 1992 to March 11, 1993, when the search warrant
was issued.

Information was obtained from fellow officers,

confidential and anonymous informants, court records and
surveillance of defendant's residence.
1.

Confidential and Anonymous Informants

In September 1992, Detective Leavitt received
information from a confidential informant that defendant was
4

involved in the distribution of controlled substances (R. 11),
see Addendum A.

Detective Leavitt believed the information to be

reliable because the informant had supplied reliable information
concerning drug distribution on four previous occasions.

Id.

Five months later, on January 28, 1993, Sergeant
Blackhurst received additional information from an anonymous
informant who reported that codefendant "was driving to the Las
Vegas area in a [t]an and [b]rown Chevrolete [sic] Corvette

..

to pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to
[defendant]"

(R. 11) , see Addendum A.

According to the

anonymous informant, the "trips occur[red] approximately every
two weeks, and [codefendant] carrie[d] a gun concealed in a
compartment behind her seat."

Id.

On March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst received
information from another anonymous informant who reported that
he/she had overheard defendant speaking on the telephone and that
defendant had stated that codefendant "would be delivering a load
within the next five to six days" (R. 11), see Addendum A.
2.

Investigation and Surveillance

Police confirmed that a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette with a
Nevada State license plate was registered to codefendant (R. 9),
see Addendum A.

Police then began a periodic surveillance of

defendant's residence on March 4, 1993 (R. 10), see Addendum A.
Codefendant's Corvette was not observed at defendant's residence
on that date; however, the Corvette was observed at defendant's
residence seven days later, on March 11, 1994. Id.
5

Additionally, during the period of surveillance a
vehicle registered to Linda lorg was observed at defendant's
residence (R. 10) , see Addendum A.

Sergeant Fox recalled that he

had previously executed a search warrant at the lorg residence in
1989 and that Iorg's son had been charged with several counts of
distribution of controlled substances as a result of that search.
Id.
3.

Corroborative Criminal Histories

The affidavit also set forth defendant's criminal
history which included a conviction for a controlled substance
offense in March 1984 (R. 10), see Addendum A.

Further, there

was a misdemeanor warrant for defendant's arrest out of the
Pleasant Grove City Court.

Id.

Codefendant's criminal history revealed that she had
been charged but not convicted for controlled substance
violations in 1988 and 1989.
B.

Id.

Pre-warrant Stop and Detention

On the basis of the foregoing, Sergeant Blackhurst
requested authority to conduct a daytime search on the morning of
March 11, 1993 (R. 14-13), see Addendum A.

Prior to the

warrant's issuance, at approximately 9:00 a.m., police began
surveillance of defendant's house which was to continue up until
Sergeant Blackhurst returned with the signed search warrant (Tr.
Aug. 26, 1993 at 37, 50) .3 While police were watching the
3

The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped
with record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to
the internal page numbers.
6

house, at approximately 10:30 a.m., defendants were observed
leaving the house and driving off in defendant's pickup truck
(Tr. 6) .
When notified of the defendants' activity, Sergeant
Blackhurst told the surveilling officers to stop them (Tr. 50).
He further instructed that no action should be taken with regard
to codefendant until the search warrant was signed (Tr. 37).
Accordingly, a marked patrol car stopped defendant's pickup
shortly after it left a nearby convenience store (Tr. 7).
Defendant, who was driving the pickup, was immediately
asked to step out of the pickup and was arrested on the
outstanding misdemeanor warrant (Tr. 8). Codefendant was
similarly requested to exit the pickup and was detained briefly
until investigating officers could confirm that the search
warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 15). Because they were awaiting
the search warrant at the time of the stop, several officers
responded to assist (Tr. 13). Approximately three police
vehicles were present, the marked car effecting the stop and two
unmarked cars.

No guns were drawn during the course of the stop

(Tr. 14) .
Approximately five minutes after the initial stop,
Sergeant Blackhurst notified Officer Cullimore, who assisted in
the stop, that the search warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 16,
38) .4 He further instructed that defendants should be
4

On signing the search warrant, Judge Dimick noted the
time as 11:30 a.m. (R. 8), see Addendum A. Sergeant Blackhurst
did not note the exact time the warrant was signed, but based on
7

transported to the jail and searched (Tr. 8). Sergeant
Blackhurst then proceeded directly to defendant's house with the
search warrant where he arrived in the next 10-15 minutes (Tr.
39, 41, 51). Officer Harris, who was waiting at the house, noted
that they had the search warrant in hand, at defendant's house,
by 11:39 a.m. (Tr. 29-30).
C. Search Results
In the meantime, defendants' were transported and
searched at the jail.

No evidence was seized directly from

either defendant's person; however, a search of codefendant's
purse revealed methamphetamine (Tr. 18). The search of
defendant's residence turned up numerous items of drug
paraphernalia, pills, leafy and seed marijuana and cocaine
crystals and residue.

Drug paraphernalia was similarly seized

from codefendant's Corvette (R. 15), see Addendum A.
D.

Motion to Suppress

Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the
ground that the search warrant lacked probable cause in violation
of federal and state constitutional provisions.

In a supporting

memorandum, defendants asserted that the affidavit failed to
demonstrate the reliability of the one confidential and two
anonymous informants; that the information was stale; and that
his memory of the sequence of events, believed the judge was
mistaken in his notation of the time (Tr. 41). In any event,
Sergeant Blackhurst did not advise Officer Cullimore to take
codefendant in for questioning until after the search warrant had
been signed (Tr. 43). Officer Cullimore noted that Sergeant
Blackhurst contacted and notified him that the warrant had been
signed prior to 11:00 a.m. (Tr. 16).
8

the criminal histories of the defendants were irrelevant (R. 2723).

In argument before the trial court, defense counsel focused

primarily on the legality of the initial stop and detention of
codefendant (Tr. 61-63).
E.

Denial of Motion to Suppress

The trial court denied defendants7 motion on September
15, 1993 (R. 43-38).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were filed on October 14, 1993 (R. 50-45).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the
Narcotics Enforcement Team received
inf v_ nation from a trusted and reliable
cor.ndential informant that Defendant Roger
Blomquist was involved in the distribution
and use of controlled substances.
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous
informant provided information that Linda
Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist,
was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown
Chevrolet Corvette to obtain controlled
substances to deliver back to Roger
Blomquist.
3. The anonymous informant said the trips
occurred every two weeks and that Edenfield
carried a gun concealed in a compartment
behind her seat.
4. In March of 1993, officers received
information from a third informant who
claimed to have overheard a telephone
conversation in which Blomquist stated that
Edenfield would be delivering a load with in
the next five to six days.
5. After receiving the information on March
4, 1993, officers began surveillance of the
residence of Blomquist and discovered that
the tan and brown Corvette was not at the
residence.

9

6. Periodic surveillance was continued until
March 10, 1993. During the period of
surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda
Iorg was seen parked at the home.
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of
controlled substances in 1989.5 Roger
Blomquist was also found to have had a
criminal record involving controlled
substances with a conviction in March 1984.
8. Officers determined that an active
warrant for the arrest of Roger Blomquist
existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court.
9. The name Linda Edenfield was also checked
and it was determined that there were several
narcotics related convictions appearing on
the record.6
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada
license number 693EPS was registered to Linda
Edenfield.
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the
information obtained by the officers was put
together in an affidavit and taken to Judge
Dimick of the Orem Circuit Court who executed
a search warrant authorizing [a] search of
the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette
registered to Linda Edenfield, the person of
Linda Edenfield, and the person of Roger
Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and
affidavit are attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced
surveillance of the Blomquist residence.
Officer Blackhurst was in the process of
acquiring the search warrant described above.
While the Blomquist residence was under
surveillance the [d]efendants, Linda
5

The Court's finding is inaccurate. lorg's home was the
subject of a search warrant in 1989. Following the search,
lorg's son was arrested on several drug related charges (R. 10),
see Addendum A.
€

The Court's finding is inaccurate. The affidavit makes
clear that codefendant had several controlled substance related
arrests, but no convictions (R. 10), see Addendum A.
10

Edenfield and Roger Blomquist, left the
residence and entered a vehicle owned by
[d]efendant Blomquist.
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped
sometime around 10:30 a.m. Blomquist was
arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was
detained briefly until officers received
information that the search warrant had been
signed.
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to
the Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield
was searched pursuant to the warrant.
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the
Edenfield vehicle were searched until the
search warrant was appropriately executed by
Judge Dimick.
16. The purse of Defendant Edenfield was
with her when the vehicle was stopped and
taken with her to the police station. The
purse was part of her person and
appropriately searched pursuant to the search
warrant.
17. The stop of Roger Blomquist and the
execution of the arrest warrant and execution
of the search warrant were essentially
contemporaneous.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Under the totality of the circumstances
analysis the facts as established in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant
established adequate probable cause to
support the search warrant issued.
Information from separate sources was
corroborative and consistent providing a
sufficient basis for the magistrate to
conclude that there was fair probability that
the evidence sought would be found in the
car, in the house, or on the person of the
individuals described.
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the
temporary detention of the [d]efendants prior
11

to the physical arrival of the search warrant
was appropriate because of the mobility of
the [d]efendants and the likelihood that they
may have had evidence upon their person.
3. All officers involved in this operation
acted in a good faith attempt to comply with
the rules of Evidence and Constitution of the
United States. Officers acted reasonably and
prudently to prevent the loss or destruction
of expected evidence without inappropriate
intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects.
4. The initial seizure of the person of
Linda Edenfield was lawful under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
5. The method employed by the officers was
reasonable and employed in a reasonable
manner in that the officers had an obvious
and legitimate concern when the suspects left
the home and entered a vehicle that evidence
would leave with them. The immediate stop
and detention without further search until
they had received information that the search
warrant being sought at the present time was
executed was appropriate. No lesser
intrusion would have preserved the evidence.
No more intrusive action was undertaken until
the fact that the warrant had been signed was
confirmed.
6. Police officers had received a valid
search warrant based upon evidence
independent of the stop and detention of
Edenfield. Even if the search took place
before the warrant was obtained the fact that
a warrant was obtained made discovery of the
evidence inevitable and the evidence should
not be suppressed even if it were to be
determined by this Court that the search took
place before execution of the warrant.
(R. 50-45) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum B ) .
Four days after the filing of the above Findings and
Conclusions, on October 18, 1993, defendant filed an objection
thereto, essentially re-arguing the basis of his motion to

12

suppress (R. 62-57).

Additionally, on October 22, 1993,

defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling (R. 6963), based on State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993).
The trial court denied defendant's motion on November
2, 1993, on the ground that Potter had not altered existing law
regarding the issuance of search warrants (R. 72) (a copy is
attached as Addendum C).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant
Blackhurst's affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the
magistrate to determine that there was current probable cause to
search defendant's house for evidence of drug trafficking.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

Three independent

informants implicated defendant and codefendant in a drug
trafficking scheme operating out of defendant's residence.

This

information was corrobrated by independent police investigation
including police observation of codefendant's suspected delivery
of contolled substances to defendant's residence on the very day
the search warrant was sought and obtained.
Notwithstanding, should the Court conclude that the
probable cause to search defendant's residence was not clearly
articulated, any defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that
police "had no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant
was properly issued."

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923

(1984) . None of the facial deficiencies that negate objective
good faith exist here.

Nor is this a case wherein the issuing
13

magistrate was mislead by knowingly or recklessly false
information.

Accordingly, police reliance on the warrant issued

was objectively reasonable, and the deterrent purpose of the
exclulsionary rule would not be served by excluding the
challenged evidence.
As for defendant's challenge to the propriety of the
stop, detention and search of codefendant, these issues pertain
only to codefendant.

Defendant's appeal has not been

consolidated with codefendant's appeal; therefore, these issues
do not present an issue for review in this case. Moreover,
defendant lacks standing to vicarously assert rights personal to
another.

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah App. 1990) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
The magistrate had a substantial basis for determining

that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search
warrant for defendant's residence.7

The affidavit was not

rendered inadequate due to allegedly unreliable and stale

7

Although the warrant also authorized a search of
defendant's person (R. 14), no incriminating evidence was found
as a result of that search (R. 13), see Addendum A. Accordingly,
the State addresses only the propriety of the warrant-supported
search of defendant's residence wherein incriminating evidence
was located. Id.
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information.8

Quite the contrary, the affidavit set forth

mutually reinforcing allegations obtained from three different
informants, as well as corroborative information gained through
independent police investigation.
A,

Informant Reliability

An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists.
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983).

See

However, "[t]hey

are not strict, independent requirements to be "rigidly
extracted' in every case."

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130

(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their
significance varies under the circumstances of each case.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203,
1205 (Utah 1984)).

For example, "if the circumstances as a whole

8

Defendant broadly asserts that the instant warrant was
an "anticipatory warrant." Br. of App. at 18-19, relying
primarily on United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir.
1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). Garcia defines an
anticipatory warrant as "a warrant that has been issued before
the necessary events have occurred which will allow a
constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not
transpire, the warrant is void." 882 F.2d at 702. Cf. State v.
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111-12 (Utah 1985) (discussing propriety of
a preprepared affidavit). However, the present facts do not
support defendant's claim; rather, all of the events set forth in
Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit occurred prior to the affidavit's
presentation to Judge Dimick (R. 15-8), see addendum A. See also
Statement of Facts, supra. Consequently, defendant has not and
cannot show that the instant warrant was in any way an
"anticipatory warrant." Accordingly, the State responds solely
to defendant's allegations concerning the adequacy of probable
cause.
15

demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less
strong showing is required."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

Such a

circumstance is found when corroborative information is provided
by multiple confidential informants.

Even if an individual

informant's information is inadequate by itself to establish
probable cause, it may nonetheless help to establish probable
cause when corroborated by additional independent sources.

State

v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993).
1. Three Independent and Corroborative
Sources
Accordingly, it is significant that three separate
informants supplied information appearing in the present
affidavit and that the information was mutually reinforcing and
corroborative.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)

("Corroboration through other sources of information reduce[s]
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale"), 9 overruled on
other grounds, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) .

Specifically, while the

confidential informant simply reported that defendant was
involved in drug trafficking, the anonymous informants
corroborated that information with details implicating
codefendant in the scheme.

The first anonymous informant

9

See also United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 103 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("fact that two apparently unassociated persons make
the same assertion increases the probability that it is true");
United States v. Landis, 726 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Interlocking tips from different confidential informants
enhance the credibility of each."), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230
(1984); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1978)
("When three unreliable but unconnected persons all report the
same fact, it is probable that the fact is true.")
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reported that codefendant made biweekly drug runs to Las Vegas in
her Corvette and the second anonymous informant reported when
codefendant would deliver the next load to defendant's residence
(R. 11), see Addendum A.

Due to the interlocking nature of the

tips, the issuing magistrate reasonably relied upon the reports
in his probable cause determination.

Id.

2. Informant's Provided Nothing in Exchange
for Information
Notwithstanding corroboration between the three
reports, the reliability and/or basis of knowledge of the
informants is otherwise demonstrated.

For example, the

informants did not receive anything in exchange for their
information.

This Court has previously recognized that when a

confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is
reliable.

State v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994).

Cf. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 ("reliability and veracity are
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from the police in exchange for the information").
3.

Confidential Informant Previously Reliable

Referring particularly to the reliability of the
confidential informant, his/her reliability is established by the
fact that he\she had provided reliable information on four
previous occasions.

Hanse^. 732 P.2d at 130; State v. Anderton,

668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983) (indicating an informant has
previously provided truthful information is an accepted method
for establishing veracity).
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4.

Anonymous Informants Provided Insider Details

Additionally, the reliability of the anonymous
informants is enhanced by the insider nature of their
information.

The first anonymous informant was able to supply

details of the drug trafficking scheme including a description of
codefendant's Corvette, the frequency and purpose of her drug
runs to Las Vegas, and her ultimate delivery of the controlled
substances to defendant (R. 11), see Addendum A.

The informant's

knowledge of codefendant's travel habits reasonably suggests that
the information was obtained either from codefendant or from
someone codefendant trusted and was therefore reliable.10
Gates, 462 U.S. at 245; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
The same can be said for information reported by the
second anonymous informant who personally overheard defendant
state when he expected codefendant to deliver the next "load."
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (informant's personal observation of
criminality is adequate to establish basis of knowledge).

10

Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Sergeant Blackhurst
testified that he later found out that the first anonymous
informant was codefendant's ex-boyfriend (Tr. 46-47). He
explained that this information was not included in the affidavit
because it was not known at that time the affidavit was prepared.
Id.
On appeal, defendant repeatedly suggests that the exboyfriend's tip was unreliable because it was motivated by anger,
hostility or revenge. Br. of App. at 21-22. Defendant's
assertions lack record support and/or legal analysis and should
not be considered here. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297
(Utah 1986) (assertions of error that are unsupported by the
record or relevant authority not ordinarily considered on
appeal); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This
Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record.").
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B. Independent Verification and
Corroboration of Significant Facts
1.

Police Investigation and Surveillance

Informant reliability is also enhanced by independent
police investigation and corroboration of significant facts.
Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

In the

present case, police verified that the described Corvette was in
fact registered to codefendant (R. 9), see Addendum A.

Police

also observed the Corvette at defendant's residence within 24
hours of its estimated arrival time (R. 10), see Addendum A.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be right
about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he
has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is
engaged in criminal activity).
Further, approximately nine days prior to the warrant's
issuance, police observed a vehicle at defendant's residence
belonging to Linda Iorg (R. 10), see Addendum A.

Iorg's house

had been the subject of a search warrant for drugs in 1989, which
search lead to the arrest of Iorg's son on several charges of
drug distribution.
2.

Id.

Criminal History

The defendants' criminal histories provided additional,
independent corroboration of the informants' allegations.

A

check of defendant's criminal history revealed a prior drug
related conviction in 1984 (R. 11), see Addendum A.
Codefendant's criminal history similarly revealed a history of
drug related arrests in 1988-89.
19

Id.

In United States v. Harris, the United States Supreme
Court considered the corroborative purposes of a suspect's
criminal reputation in a search warrant affidavit.
581-83 (1971).

4 03 U.S. 573,

The Court made clear that while a suspect's

"reputation, standing

alone,

was insufficient" to establish

probable cause; reputation was relevant to the probable cause
determination "when supported by other information."

Id. at 583.

Accordingly, the Court declined to interpret its prior cases as
prohibiting the use of such "probative information."

Id.

Rather, the Court concluded that it was entirely proper for a
magistrate to rely upon the affiant's knowledge of a suspect's
reputation in assessing probable cause.

Id.

We cannot conclude that a policeman's
knowledge of a suspect's reputation something that policemen frequently know and
a factor that impressed such a "legal
technician" as Mr. Justice Frankfurter - is
not a "practical consideration of everyday
life" upon which an officer (or a magistrate)
may properly rely in assessing the
reliability of an informant's tip.
Id.

See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271 (discussed in Harris, wherein

Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority, held that information
"that [Jones] was a known user of narcotics made the charge (drug
trafficking) against him much less subject to sceptism than would
be such a charge against one without such a history")).
appellate court's have similarly held.

Utah's

See e.g. Bailey, 675 P.2d

at 1204, 1206 (police verification of Bailey's prior convictions
for burglary and auto theft enhanced reliability of confidential
informant's allegation that Bailey was involved in current
20

burglary and theft); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App.
1993) (confidential informant's allegations of suspect's
involvement in drug trafficking found to "mesh" with affiant
officer's knowledge of suspect's "histcry of substance abuse and
sales"); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (1991) (affidavit
held to sufficiently establish named informant's reliability
where informant accurately detailed Buford's prior criminal
history of illegal drug use and sale)-11

But Cf. Viah, 871 P.2d

at 1031; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993);
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (all overlooking corroborative nature of
suspect's criminal history and holding criminal history not
properly part of probable cause determination).
C.

Current Probable Cause

Defendant disputes that the foregoing information
supports a finding of current probable cause.

He complains both

about the seven months between the initial incriminating tip and

11

Accord Comonwealth v. Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1243, 4546 (Mass. 1993) (defendant's 1978 narcotic conviction held
corroborative of informant's tip concerning defendant's
involvement in drug trafficking scheme); Malcolm v. State, 550
A.2d 670, 671, 675 (Md. 1988) (suspect's 1980 narcotic conviction
held to corroborate informant's allegations of drug trafficking);
State v. Amerman 581 A.2d 19, 30-31 (Md. App. 1990) (threefold
purpose for including suspect's criminal history in search
warrant affidavit is to: 1) demonstrate suspect's tendency to
engage in related criminality; 2) independently corroborate
informant's allegations of suspect's involvement in related
offense; 3) demonstrate ongoing nature of suspect's involvement
in continuous criminal enterprise); People v. Keller, 505
N.Y.S.2d 802, 806-07 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1986) (arson suspect's prior
arson arrests deemed relevant consideration in determining
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant).
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the issuance of a search warrant, and about the relevance of his
nine year old drug-related conviction.

Due, however, to the

significant fact that the search warrant was sought and executed
on the very day codefendant was suspected to have delivered a
load of controlled substances to defendant's residence,
defendant's staleness challenge must fail.
As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court,
Staleness issues usually arise when a
significant lapse of time occurs between the
discovery of information suggesting that
evidence of the crime can be found at a
particular locale and the magistrate's
finding of probable cause or the execution of
the warrant. The concern is whether so much
time has passed that there is no longer
probable cause to believe that the evidence
is still at the targeted locale.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).

Defendant fails to demonstrate any such significant

lapse of time in this case.
Police first began receiving reports of defendant's
involvement in drug trafficking in September 1992 (R. 11), see
Addendum A.

Five months later, an anonymous informant provided

additional details concerning codefendant's involvement,
including her ongoing and biweekly trips to Nevada to purchase
controlled substances.

Id.

On March 3, 1993, approximately nine

days before the warrant was sought, police observed the Iorg
vehicle (persons known to be involved in controlled substances),
at defendant's residence (R. 10), see Addendum A.

One day later,

on March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst heard from yet another
anonymous informant who reported that defendant expected
22

codefendant's next "load" to be delivered on or about March 10,
1993 (R. 11), see Addendum A.

Then, on March 11, 1993,

codefendant's Corvette was observed at defendant's residence (R.
10), see Addendum A.

With the foregoing information set forth in

an affidavit, Sergeant Blackhurst sought a search warrant that
very morning.

Because defendant cannot show a significant lapse

of time between the observation of codefendant's Corvette at his
residence and the warrant's issuance, defendant's staleness
challenge fails.

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260.

See also Singleton,

854 P.2d at 1017-18, 1021 (approving search warrant obtained
approximately 5 weeks after receipt of most recent incriminating
evidence) .12
Further, the affidavit alleges more than just an
isolated incident of criminality.

United States v. Johnson, 461

F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) ("where the affidavit properly
recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less
significant" to the determination of current probable cause).
12

Accord United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd
Cir. 1990) (continuous nature of narcotics conspiracies precludes
staleness challenge to affidavit based on approximate 18 month
delay between procuring informant's statements and obtaining
search warrant); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597
(1st Cir. 1985) (approving affidavit alleging defendants'
involvement in marijuana distribution one year earlier); Gardner
v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 410-411 (Del. 1989) (rejecting staleness
challenge to affidavit based on 10 month hiatus between anonymous
tip alleging defendant's drug activity and date search warrant
was issued), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990); State v.
Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1204 (N.H. 1986) (affirming probable
cause determination based on informant's allegation of
defendant's drug possession approximately seven months prior to
affidavit).
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Rather, the affidavit sets forth an ongoing pattern of criminal
activity; particularly, codefendant's biweekly drug runs to Las
Vegas.

As acknowledged by this Court, drug trafficking is widely

recognized as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal
enterprise.

Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 (citing, United States

v. Feola. 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that
drug distribution schemes "are the very paradigm of the
continuing enterprises for which courts have relaxed the temporal
requirements of non-staleness"), aff'd. 875 F.2d 857 (2d. Cir.),
cert, denied, Marin v. United States, 493 U.S. 834 (1989)).
Accordingly, in addition to its corroborative purposes, see Part
B, supra, defendant's prior drug related conviction is properly
used to demonstrate that his involvement with controlled
substances has been continuous over the years and was ongoing at
the time of the warrant.

State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54, 55-57

(Utah App. 1989) (approximately eight year old conviction for
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert.
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, a common
sense reading of Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit suggests that
there was probable cause to search defendant's residence.

The

trial court thus properly applied the highly deferential
standards of review in examining the magistrate's determination
of probable cause.

It correctly rejected defendant's arguments

that the information received from three independent informants
24

was not reliable and was also stale in favor of the conclusion
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that
there was a fair probability that evidence of the defendants'
drug distribution scheme would be found inside defendant's
residence.

Given the "Fourth Amendment's strong preference for

searches conducted pursuant to a warrant," Gates, 462 U.S. at
236, this Court should similarly conclude that the magistrate had
sufficient foundation for determining that probable cause
existed.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE,
POLICE EXERCISED GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON THE
WARRANT
Even if this Court were to conclude that Sergeant
Blackhurst's affidavit was for some reason inadequate, the
evidence seized would still be admissible under the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the trial court so ruled (R. 46),
see Addendum B.13
Leon avoids suppression of evidence seized pursuant to
a subsequently-invalidated search warrant, provided that officers

13

Defendant did not develop a state constitutional
analysis of the good faith issue in the trial court, nor has he
done so on appeal. Therefore, in the event the Court deems it
necessary to reach this issue, the Court's analysis "must proceed
solely under federal constitutional law." State v. Horton, 848
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993). See State v. Collard. 810 P.2d
884, 885 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) (Utah apppellate courts "will not
engage in a state constitutional analysis unless a party briefs a
different analysis under the state constitution than that which
flows from the federal Constitution.").
25

conducting the search believed in good faith the warrant was
valid.

Further, the Leon exception to suppression requires that

reliance on the defective warrant be objectively reasonable.
Only then is the seized evidence admissible:
In the absence of an allegation that the
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral
role, suppression is appropriate only if the
officers were dishonest or reckless in
preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause.
Id. at 926.
Although defendant has not expressly challenged the
good faith of the officers relying on the warrant, he does
attempt to analogize the instant affidavit to that in State v.
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989).

The Droneburg

affidavit relied solely on information obtained from one
confidential informant.

Id. at 13 03.

Athough the informant had

previously provided reliable information, his/her assertion was
vague and conclusory, consisting of the bare allegation that
controlled substances would be delivered to a residence in
Panguitch, Utah, between between the hours of 2:00 and 4:00 a.m..
Id.

The affidavit was devoid of any corroborative information.

Id.

Because the Dronebura affidavit was "so lacking in indicia

of probable cause" the State conceded "it was unreasonable for
the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely on a warrant
issued on the strength of it."

Id. at 1305.

The instant affidavit is distinguishable from the illfated Droneburg affidavit.

Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit set
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forth mutually reinforcing and incriminating information gleaned
from three different informants, as well as significant
corroborating information obtained through independent police
investigation.

See Part B, supra.

Even if Sergeant Blackhurst's

affidavit failed in some way to clearly articulate probable
cause, it was not so inadequate that police could not have acted
in objectively reasonable reliance on the search warrant that was
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

None of the facial

deficiencies that negate objective good faith exist here. Leon,
468 U.S. at 923, 926. Nor is this a case wherein the issuing
magistrate was mislead by knowingly or recklessly false
information, or otherwise failed to perform his neutral and
detached function.

Id.; State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

Consequently, any

defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that police "had no
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly
issued."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Therefore, police reliance on

the warrant issued was objectively reasonable and the deterrent
purpose of the exclulsionary rule would not be served by
excluding the challenged evidence.
POINT III
DEFENDANT CHALLENGES THE PROPRIETY OF THE
STOP, DETENTION AND SEARCH OF CODEFENDANT;
HOWEVER, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN
CONSOLIDATED WITH CODEFENDANT'S APPEAL AND HE
LACKS STANDING TO VICARIOUSLY ASSERT ISSUES
PERSONAL TO CODEFENDANT
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that the
stop, detainment and search of codefendant was not authorized by
27

the warrant or by exigent circumstances.

Br. of App. at 25-2 8.

These issues relate only to codefendant.

Indeed, with reference

to his own case, defendant concedes the validity of the stop.
Br. of App. at 27.

Defendant's appeal has not been consolidated

with that of codefendant.
Appeals No. 94 0368.

See State v. Edenfield, Utah Court of

Moreover, defendant lacks standing to

challenge the propriety of these actions on codefendant's
behalf;14 nor does he attempt to so argue.
25-28.

See Br. of App. at

Rather, it appears that defense counsel, who represents

both defendant and codefendant, has filed identical briefs for
each defendant and therein included points relevant to only one
or the other defendant.
No. 940368 at 25-28.

Compare Br. of Appellant Edenfield, Case

Accordingly, the State does not here

respond to the issues raised in defendant's Point II which are
relevant only to codefendant.

The State will instead respond to

the identical argument in its responsive brief in codefendant's
appeal, Edenfield, Case No. 940368-CA.

14

See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah App. 1990)
(fourth amendment rights are personal rights which may not be
vicariously asserted), denial of Habeas Corpus aff'd, 853 P.2d
898 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 p.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the
denial of the motion to suppress and affirm defendant's
convictions.
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JAN GRAHAM
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199
Deputy County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84611
Telephone 801-370-8026
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE
IN THE MATTER OF
SEARCH WARRANT
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

:

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY POLICE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrate's
Endorsement

_^'"

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me
this 11th day of March, 1993, that there
is probable cause to believe the following:

1. The property described below:

has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense or is
evidence of illegal conduct.
£^
2. The property described below is most probably located
upon the person or at the premises also set forth below.
[^
3. The person or entity in possession of the property is
a party to the alleged illegal conduct.
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AHD EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons:
The persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edinfield. The
residence of the suspect(s), located at 126 South main Pleasant
Grove and surrounding curtledge and outbuildings. The residence is
more specifically described as a white stucco single family
dwelling on the West side of main street in Pleasant Grove facing
East. The residence has a dirt driveway of the North side and is
the first residence south of the intersection of 100 North main
street. There is a white brick unattached garage behind the
residence on the West side.
The suspects vehicle that is described as a 1981 Chevrolet
Corvette bearing Nevada License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is
registered to Linda Edinfield.

You are directed to search for the presence of controlled
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other
contraband associated with controlled substances.
THIS WARRANT HAY BE SERVED:
IN THE DAYTIME
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any seized evidence, identifying the place
where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE
UF ISSUANCE.
Dated this

\A

day of ^ f e ^ l 9 9 2 at

J/^^%^f^^:

M a g i'B « rtfte Y^Ks^**^,

3S=L" -U"

".' \„

• f

•"

CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTHENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
-VS-

)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF A
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

STATE OF UTAH,

)
:
)

COUNTY OF UTAH

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT
IH SUPPORT OF AND NOTION
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
Case No.

SS.

1. MIKE BLACKHURST , Being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:

2. That I am a police officer for the Pleasant Grove
Police Department, Pleasant Grove,

Utah County, Utah.

3. That I have been employed as a Policeman for the past
twenty four years and that I am currently assigned to the Utah
County Narcotics Task force. I have received training from the Utah
State Police Officers Standards and Training Academy, the Utah Drug
academy,

and

the DEA drug

academy.

This training

covered

all

aspects of drug enforcement and included substance identification,
confidential informants, undercover operations, controlled buys,
undercover drug buys, drafting search warrants, executing search
warrants, and all other areas of drug enforcement.
1 have had experience in making undercover drug buys, writing and

their information, and conducting surveillance.

4. That in September of 1992, Detective Aundre Leavitt
recieved

information

from

a confidential

informant

that

Roger

Blomquist's was involved in the distribution and use of controlled
substances.

b. That this same confidential informant has supplied
information on as many as four individuals who were involved in the
distribution of controlled substances and that this information has
been proven to be reliable through other investigative methods.

6. That on January 28th,

1993, your affiant received

information from an anonymous informant who said that that Linda
Edinfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, was driving to the
Las

Vegas

area

in

a

Tan

and

Brown

Chevrolete

Corvette.

The

anonymous informant stated that the reason for these trips was to
pick

up

controlled

substances

to

be

delivered

back

to

Roger

blomquist. These trips occur approximately every two weeks, and
that Linda carries a gun concealed in a compartment

behind her

seat.

7.

That

on

March

4th,

1993,

your

affiant

received

information from a different anonymous informant who stated that a
telephone conversation had been overheard in which Roger Blomquist
stated that Linda Edinfield would be delivering a load within the
next five to six days.

8. That with the above information on March 4th, 1993,
surveillance was conducted at the residence of Roger Blomquist and
it was discovered that the Tan and Brown Corvette was not at the
residence. Periodic surveillance was conducted to watch for the
arrival of the Corvette and it did arrive on March 11th, 1993.

9. That during the periodic surveillance Sergeant Lee Fox
observed a vehicle parked at the Blomquist residence on March 3rd,
1993. This vehicle was bearing Utah License plate #942 BHN, and was
registered

to

Linda

Iorg.

Sergeant

Fox

recalled

that

he

had

conducted a serach warrant on the Iorg residence in 1989 wherein
the

son

of

Linda

Iorg

was

arrested

on

several

counts

of

distribution of controlled substance.

10. That a records check was conducted on both Roger
Blomquist and his girlfriend Linda Edinfield. It was found that
Roger

Blomquist

substances

with

has
a

a

criminal

conviction

in

record
March

involving
of

1984.

It

controlled
was

also

discovered that there was a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest out
of the Pleasant Grove City Court.

11. That the records check of Linda Edinfield revealed
that

she has a criminal history

charged

but never

cocaine

in

1988,

substance in 1989.

convicted
and

two

indicating

with two

counts

of

counts

that

she has been

of possession

possession

of

of

controlled

12. That the vehicle Linda Edinfield is driving is more
specifically
License

described as a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada

plate

#693

EPS.

The

vehicle

is

registered

to

Linda

Edinfield.

13J That the residence of Roger Blomquist is located at
126 South Main in Pleasant Grove and is more specifically described
as a white stucco single family dwelling on the West side of main
street in Pleasant Grove facing East. The residence has a dirt
driveway of the North side and is the first residence south of the
intersection

of 100 North main street. There is a white brick

unattached garage behind the residence on the West side.

14. That it is your affiants experience that subjects who
deal

in

associated

controlled

substance

wil

commonly

keep

other

items

with their drug business in their possession. These

items include drug paraphernalia,

buy/owe sheets,

scales, drug

money, or any other items that would facilitate their drug deals.

15. That it is your affiants experience that those who
deal in controlled substance will often conceal their drugs outside
of their residence upon the curtledge of their property.

16. That the materials sought by this application for a
search and seizure warrant are being held in violation of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act and are evidence of felonious drug crime,

wherefore, your affiant respectfully requests that the Court issue
its warrant for the search at any time of the day

of the residence

described above, and the person of the suspects, Roger Blomquist
and

Linda

Edinfield,

for

the

presence

therein

of

controlled

substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other
contraband associated with controlled substances.

MIKE BLACKHURST
AFFIANT

Subscribed and eworn to before me this 11th day gf^gorgh,, 1993, at

1/130

hrs.

SEARCH WARRANT RETURN
)
"",1 '" <- ' ' ; " ^
rfdZ-^ffl
ss
)
/
v
COUNTY OF UTAH
)
7^4
;/^/
INVENTORY OF PROPERTY TAKEN FROM THE RESIDENCE OF ROGER BLOMQUIS'Tp
126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on
March 11, 1993, "l>y
authority of within SEARCH WARRANT issued by JUDGE DIMMICK, Circuit
Court Judge, County of Utah, 1993.
STATE OF UTAH

1.

Small metal can with rolling papers, 2 baggies containing
marijuana, cigarette lighter and scissors.

2.

Razor blade, glass tube with white crystals, glass pipe,
rolled up in a white towel.

3.

Pill in cigarette cellophane.

4.

Cigarette cellophane with 3 brown pills.

5.

Scales, hemostats, pipe, wire, 3 plastic funnels and marijuana
seeds•

6.

Hemostat.

7.

Round red tin can containing wooden pipe, white pills in
cellophane.

8.

2 straws in Corvette passenger seat.

9.

Marijuana roach, in Corvette passenger seat.

10.

2 cigarette cellophane packages with marijuana seeds.

11.

Brown vial with white residue.

I, SGT. MIKE BLACKHURST, the police officer by whom this
warrant was executed, do swear that I
and the above inventory contains a true
of all property taken by me on the said

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
1993.

ADDENDUM B

F5LED

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026

Fourth Judical District Court
of Utah County, State of Uta.1*
, CARMA p. SMITH, Cferk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS,

ROGER A. BLOMQUIST, and
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD,

^ase No. $314003£. FS
~e No. S31000385^S

Defendant(s) .

Judge Boyd L. Park

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park
presiding on the 26th day of August, 1993.

The Defendants were

present in person and represented by Attorney Shelden R. Carter.
The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, James
R. Taylor. The Court having heard the evidence in this matter and
issued a Memorandum Decision does make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In September of 1992, a detective of the Narcotics

Enforcement Team received information from a trusted and reliable
confidential informant that Defendant Roger Blomquist was involved
in the distribution and use of controlled substances.
2.

In January of 1993, a separate anonymous informant

provided information that Linda Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger

m>

DO

Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown Chevrolet
Corvette to obtain controlled substances to deliver back to Roger
Blomquist.
3. The anonymous informant said the trips occurred every two
weeks and that Edenfield carried a gun concealed in a compartment
behind her seat.
4.
third

In March of 1993, officers received information from a
informant

who

claimed

to

have

overheard

a

telephone

conversation in which Blomquist stated that Edenfield would be
delivering a load within the next five to six days.
5. After receiving the information on March 4, 1993, officers
began surveillance of the residence of Blomquist and discovered
that the tan and brown Corvette was not at the residence.
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until March 10, 1993.
During the period of surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda
Iorg was seen parked at the home.
7.

Iorg was arrested

substances in 1989.

on several

counts

of

controlled

Roger Blomquist was also found to have had a

criminal record involving controlled substances with a conviction
in March of 1984.
8. Officers determined that an active warrant for the arrest
of Roger Blomquist existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court.
9.

The name Linda Edenfield was also checked and it was

determined that there were several narcotics related convictions

2

appearing on the record.
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada, license number 693EPS
was registered to Linda Edenfield.
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the information obtained by the
officers was put together in an affidavit and taken to Judge Dimick
of the Orem Circuit Court who executed a search warrant authorizing
search of the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette registered to
Linda Edenfield, the person of Linda Edenfield, and the person of
Roger Blomquist.

A copy of the search warrant and affidavit are

attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced surveillance of the
Blomquist residence.

Officer Blackhurst was in the process of

acquiring the search warrant described above. While the Blomquist
residence was under surveillance the Defendants, Linda Edenfield
and Roger Blomquist, left the residence and entered a vehicle owned
by Defendant Blomquist.
13.
a.m.

The Blomquist vehicle was stopped sometime around 10:30

Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was

detained briefly until officers received information that the
search warrant had been signed.
14.

Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to the

Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield was searched
pursuant to the warrant.
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the Edenfield vehicle

3

were searched until the search warrant was appropriately executed
by Judge Dimick.
16.

The purse of Defendant Edenfield was with her when the

vehicle was stopped and taken with her to the police station. The
purse was part of her person and appropriately searched pursuant to
the search warrant•
17.

The stop of Roger Blomguist and the execution of the

arrest warrant and execution of the search warrant were essentially
contemporaneous.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Under the totality of the circumstances analysis the facts
as established in the affidavit in support of the search warrant
established adequate probable cause to support the search warrant
issued.

Information from separate sources was corroborative and

consistent providing a sufficient basis for the Magistrate to
conclude that there was fair probability that the evidence sought
would be found in the car, in the house, or on the person of the
individuals described.
2.

The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the temporary

detention of the Defendants prior to the physical arrival of the
search warrant was appropriate because of the mobility of the

4

4i

Defendants and the likelihood that they may have had evidence upon
their person.
3.

All officers involved in this operation acted in a good

faith attempt to comply with the Rules of Evidence and Constitution
of the United States.
prevent

Officers acted reasonably and prudently to

the loss or destruction of expected evidence without

inappropriate intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects.
4.

The initial seizure of the person of Lir*u~ Edenfield was

lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
5.

The method employed by the officers was reasonable and

employed in a reasonable manner in that the officers had an obvious
and legitimate concern when the suspects left the home and entered
a vehicle that evidence would leave with them.

The immediate stop

and detention without further search until they had received
information that the search warrant being sought at the present
time was executed was appropriate. No lesser intrusion would have
preserved the evidence.

No more intrusive action was undertaken

until the fact that the warrant had been signed was confirmed.
6.

Police officers had received a valid search warrant based

upon evidence independent of the stop and detention of Edenfield.
Even if the search took place before the warrant was obtained the
fact that a warrant was obtained made discovery of the evidence
inevitable and the evidence should not be suppressed even if it
were to be determined by this Court that the search took place
5

before execution of the warrant.
DATED this

/ /

day of October, 1993.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SHELDEN R. CARTER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

6
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FlLtu ta

Utah Courtot Appeal

Marilyn M- Branch
cferkof the Court

ADDENDUM C

rH

D.'S
STA7r <

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 931400385 & 386

vs.

DATE: November 2, 1993
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST

CLERK: LHH
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling.
Defendants contend the case of State v. Potter, 221 Ut. Adv. Reports 29, compels this
court to rule differently regarding Defendants' Motion to Suppress. This court issued its
Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on September 15, 1993.
The court having read the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Response and the case of State v. Potter, and being fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:
RULING
(1)

Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling is denied. This court does not

believe Potter alters the existing law in this state regarding search warrants.
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
cc:

Utah County Attorney
Shelden Carter, Esq.
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

NOV 1 5 1994
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Marilyn M.Branch
Clerk of the Court

REED RICHARDS
Chief Deputy Attorney General

Director of Public Policy & Communications

JAN

CAROL CLAWSON
Solicitor General

GRAHAM

PALMER DEPAULIS

November 15, 1994

Marilyn Branch
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: State v. Edenfield. Case No. 940368-CA,
and State v. Blomauist. Case No, 940369-CA.
Dear Ms. Branch:
Since the filing of the State's responsive briefs in
these matters, pertinent and significant authority has come to my
attention concerning the issue set out in the State's Edenfield
brief at Point II (B) (2), pp. 26-28, and in the State's Blomauist
brief at Point 1(B)(2), pp. 19-21. The State cites as
supplemental authority, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66
(Utah App. 1987).
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to
rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sincerely,

Assistant Attorney General
cc: Shelden R. Carter
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UTAH

84114
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T E L :

801-538-9600

FAX:

538-1135

